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Abstract—Storing data in the cloud poses a number of privacy 
issues. A way to handle them is supporting data replication and 
distribution on the cloud via a local, centrally synchronized 
storage. In this paper we propose to use an in-memory RDBMS 
with row-level data encryption for granting and revoking access 
rights to distributed data. This type of solution is rarely adopted 
in conventional RDBMSs because it requires several complex 
steps.  In this paper we focus on implementation and 
benchmarking of a test system, which shows that our simple yet 
effective solution overcomes most of the problems. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Storing sensitive data in the cloud may lead to security fault 
when it resides on untrusted servers. To solve this issue, a 
distributed approach was presented in [1], where agents share 
confidential data in a secure manner using simple grant-and-
revoke permissions on shared data. The additional step was the 
implementation of a distributed DBMS with row-level 
encryption capabilities to enable a strong access control to 
records, allowing revocation of rights. This solution is not 
frequent in literature because of its inherent slowness. In this 
paper we present a real implementation of such software and 
describe how we solved the performance problems.  
We first describe a schematic model that we introduced in a 
previous paper (section II), then, after taking a survey on 
cryptography in databases (section III), granularity in  
database-level encryption (section IV) and in-memory 
databases (section V), we describe our solution (section VI), 
that we implemented and benchmarked (section VII). 
II. THE DISTRIBUTED ARCHITECTURE 
A. The model  
Hereon, we will use the term dossier to indicate a set of 
correlated information. Our data model is informally 
represented in Fig. 1. To simplify the discussion, we introduce 
the following assumptions:  
• Each dossier has only one owner; 
• Only the dossier's owner can change it. 
These assumptions permit the use of an elementary cascade 
synchronization in which the owner will submit the changes to 
the receivers.  
 
Figure 1.  The model  
In the model, each node represents a local, single-user 
application/database dedicated to an individual user (un). The 
node stores only the dossiers that un owns. Shared dossiers (in 
this example, d1) are replicated on each node. When a node 
modifies a shared dossier, it must synchronize with the other 
nodes that hold a copy of it.  
 
Figure 2.  The distributed architecture 
Our solution (Fig. 2) consists of two parts: a trusted client 
agent and a remote untrusted synchronizer on the cloud.  
The client maintains local data storage where:  
• The dossiers whom she owns are (or at least can be) 
stored as plaintext; 
• The others, instead, are encrypted, each using a 
different key.  
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The Synchronizer stores the keys to decrypt the shared 
dossiers owned by the local client and the modified dossiers to 
synchronize. No information is in clear-form: dossiers are 
encrypted using the keys, which, in turn, are encrypted using 
the receivers’ public keys. When another client needs to 
decrypt a dossier, she must connect to the Synchronizer and 
obtain the corresponding decryption key.  The data and the 
keys are stored in two separate entities and therefore none can 
access information without the collaboration of the other part.  
III. CRYPTOGRAPHY IN DATABASES 
Confidentiality, integrity and availability are the main 
properties of database protection. Confidentiality has been 
defined by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) in ISO-177991 as "ensuring that information is accessible 
only to those authorized to have access"; data integrity assures 
that none can modify the information without a trace; 
availability provides access to data by authorized users in a 
reasonable time. Along the years, a lot of ACP (Access Control 
Policy) have been defined, based on database model (relational 
rather than object) and policy control (i.e., DAC-Discretionary 
Access Control, RBACC-Role-Based Access Control, MAC-
Mandatory Access Control). Traditionally, ACPs are based on 
the assumption that the DBA (DataBase Administrator) is 
trusted, but it is not assured in the outsourced data centers and 
in the cloud, where the platform-as-a-service (PaaS) provider is 
external to data owner. A solution to this problem is that the 
DBMS treats only raw-data, encrypted in such a way that DBA 
(or another intruder) cannot read the information. There are 
three main categories of database encryption [4]: 
• Storage level encryption 
• Database level encryption 
• Application level encryption 
A. Storage-level encryption (SLE) 
Data is encrypted either at the file level (NAS/DAS) or at 
the block level (SAN) [5]. A short while ago, Toshiba has 
released a hardware implementation of SLE, a family of hard 
drives - called Self-Encrypting Disk. The system is based on 
the Opal specifications of Trusted Computing Group, supports 
native encryption AES 256 and can automatically delete its 
contents if not used by the rightful owner. This encryption is 
not selective; it encrypts an entire support or portions of 
support. It prevents theft of storage but it is unsuitable for 
preventing unauthorized access by a honest-but-curious system 
administrator. On the other hand, it is entirely transparent to the 
system, so it needs no database modification. 
B. Database-level encryption (DLE) 
DLE secures data as it is written to and read from a 
database. The encryption is applied to the db at various 
granularities, such as database, tables, columns (most 
frequently), and rows. It can be related with some logical 
conditions for selecting affected data, too. The cons are:  
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• DLE is not transparent to application as SLE, so it 
involves some modifications to the indexed encrypted 
data and in stored procedures and triggers;  
• The system is slowed down by the encryption 
overhead; 
• Usually, it is not a defense from the curious DBAs. 
C. Application-level encryption (ALE) 
In this case, data is encrypted/decrypted by the application 
that generates it. Plain-text data is made available only at client 
side, while data sent over the network is encrypted. This 
scheme usually involves returning larger result sets to the 
client, which are then filtered at client side, when decrypted. To 
accomplish this result, applications need to be modified and the 
network traffic increases. 
IV. GRANULARITY IN  DATABASE-LEVEL ENCRYPTION 
The most common solution for data protection is DLE, 
which can have different types of granularity: 
• database 
• tables 
• columns 
• rows 
A. Database 
In this case, the whole database is encrypted using only one 
key, as if it was a single file. The cons of this encryption are: 
• It doesn't allow to define different privileges on each 
table; 
• The schema definition becomes particularly complex; 
• The system performance suffers considerable 
degradation (an improvement can be achieved with 
appropriate caching); 
• Its effectiveness is closely linked to the degree of 
confidence with which the master key is kept. 
For these reasons, the database granularity solution is 
seldom used. 
B. Tables 
A specific key encrypts each table separately. Performances 
are better than the previous solution, but still very far from 
those of a clear-text database, because encrypting an existing 
table can be very slow. The definition (and enforcement) of 
integrity constraints, foreign keys and indexes are very 
complex. 
C. Columns 
All the data in a column (or set of columns) of a table is 
encrypted with the same key. This is the solution adopted by 
most DBMS suppliers, as it allows encrypting only sensitive 
data. However, it needs to build ad-hoc indexes customized for 
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the expected queries (again, at the expense of performance). 
With this approach, it is also not possible to define access 
privileges on "horizontal" portions of a table such as row sets 
(e.g., allowing access only to rows with id> 100), as it is 
awkward to encrypt rows with different keys depending on the 
user. This type of mechanism usually relies on third-party 
applications, or otherwise it is delegated to instruments such as 
triggers or stored procedures. 
D. Rows 
Each single row in a table is encrypted using a different 
key. The main advantage of this technique is the capability to 
define access control on a subset of data (rows) of a table 
basing on the distribution of decryption keys. Let’s assume that 
we have a table that includes the data of all students in a 
university and we want to grant access to the secretary's office 
of each course only to data of students enrolled in that course. 
If we are using database or table-level encryption, we would 
have to create a view for each course and grant the rights to the 
corresponding secretary's office, with the problems outlined 
above (also, data stays readable by the DBAs). Using column-
level encryption, the permissions must be specified at the field 
level and, unless appropriate indexes or cumbersome 
procedures are implemented (which may also expose the data 
to inference or statistical attacks), it would be impossible to 
make the information instantly accessible to authorized users. 
Using row-level encryption, instead, it is possible to make 
available to the authorized user the keys (or the key) that can be 
used to decrypt only the allowed rows. This technique, beside 
to ensure a better management of access permissions, prevents 
any kind of statistical analysis on the table. In a normal 
RDBMS, however, this technique has significant disadvantages 
in terms of performance and functionality: querying would be 
possible only through the construction of appropriate indexes 
for each column of the table (with a considerable waste of 
resources both in terms of time and space), while the 
constraints and foreign keys would be almost unusable. 
Another major issue concerns the management of keys: row-
level encryption could potentially lead to the generation and 
maintenance (and / or distribution) of a key for each row of 
each table encrypted with this method. To solve (or reduce) the 
problem, we can use some techniques of key management, 
such as: 
• Broadcast (or Group) encryption[13]: rows are divided 
into equivalence classes, based on recipients. Every 
class is encrypted using an asymmetric algorithm 
where the encryption key is made in a way that each 
recipient can decrypt the information using only its 
own private key. Either the public and the private keys 
are generated by a trusted entity. 
• Identity Based Encryption [11]: it bounds the 
encryption key to the identity of recipient. Each 
recipient generates by itself a key pair used to 
encrypt/decrypt information. 
• Attribute Based Encryption [12]: it bounds the 
encryption key to an attribute (a group) of recipient. 
Each recipient  receives by a trusted entity the private 
key used to decrypt, while the encryption key is 
calculated by the sender. 
However these techniques are complex and therefore 
conventional RDBMSs don't use encryption at the row-level. 
V. IN MEMORY DATABASES 
“An in-memory database (IMDB also known as main 
memory database system or MMDB and as real-time database 
or RTDB) is a database management system that primarily 
relies on main memory for computer data storage.” 2  It is 
interesting noting that, while a conventional database system 
stores data on disk but caches it into memory for access, in an 
IMDB the data resides permanently in the main physical 
memory and there is a backup copy on disk [14]. “In-memory 
databases have recently become an intriguing topic for the 
database industry. With the mainstream availability of 64-bit 
servers with many gigabytes of memory a completely RAM 
based database solution is a tempting prospect to a much wider 
audience.” 3 IMDBs are intended either for personal use 
(because they are comparatively small w.r.t. traditional 
databases), or for performance-critical systems (for their very 
low response time and very high throughput). They use main 
memory structures, so they need no translation from disk to 
memory form, and no caching and they perform better than 
traditional DBMSs with Solid State Disks. Usually, the use of 
volatile memory-based IMDBs supports the three ACID 
properties of atomicity, consistency and isolation, but lacks 
support for the durability property. To add this when non-
volatile random access memory (NVRAM) is not available, 
IMDBs use a combination of transaction logging and primary 
database check-pointing to the system's hard disk: they log 
changes from committed transactions to physical medium and, 
periodically, update a disk image of the database. Having to 
write updates to disk, the write operations are heavier than 
read-only. Logging policies vary from product to product: 
some leave the choice of when to write the application on file, 
others do all the checkpoints at regular intervals of time or after 
a certain amount of data entered / edited. 
TABLEI. IMDBS PROS AND CONS 
Pros Cons 
Fast transactions 
No translation 
High reliability 
Multi-User concurrency 
Complexity of durability 
 
Obviously, the limitation of this type of database is related 
to the amount of RAM on computer hosting the db. But given 
their nature, IMDBs are well suited to be distributed and 
replicated across multiple nodes to increase capacity and 
performance. The proposed solution works around this 
limitation: not having a single central database containing the 
whole data, we preferred to give one database for each client 
application. This database contains only owned data, while 
external data will be added (or removed) via the Synchronizer, 
based on access permissions. To minimize cryptography 
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overhead, we encrypt only rows "received" by other nodes, 
while rows owned by the local node are stored in clear form.  
Well-known open solutions of IMDB are Apache Derby, 
HyperSQL (HSQLDB) and SQLite. For our implementation, 
we chose to use the open source HyperSQL rel. 2.0. 
A. HyperSql 
HyperSQL4 is a pure Java RDBMS. Its strength is, besides 
the lightness (about 1.3Mb for version 2.0), the capability to 
run either as a Server instance either as a module internal to an 
application (in-process). A database started "in-process" has the 
advantage of speed, but it is dedicated only to the containing 
application (no other application can query the database). For 
our purposes, we chose server mode. In this way, the database 
engine runs inside a JVM and will start one or more 
"in-process” databases, listening requests from processes in the 
local machine or remote computers. For interactions between 
clients and database server, we can use three different 
protocols: 
• HSQL Server: the fastest and most used. It implements 
a proprietary communication protocol; 
• HTTP Server: it is used when access to the server is 
limited only to HTTP. It consists of a web server that 
allows JDBC clients to connect over http; 
• HTTP Servlet: as the Http Server, but it is used when 
accessing the database is managed by a servlet 
container or by an application servlet (e.g. Tomcat). It 
is limited to using a single database. 
There are different types of databases (called catalogs) that 
can be created with HyperSQL, that differ in the methodology 
adopted for data storage: 
• res: this type of catalog provides for the storage of data 
into small JAR or ZIP files; 
• mem: data is stored completely in the machine’s RAM, 
so there is no persistence of information outside of the 
application life cycle in the JVM; 
• file: data is stored in files residing into the file system 
of the machine.  
In our work we used the last type of catalog. A catalog file 
can use up to six files on the file system for its operations. The 
name of these files consists of the name of the database plus a 
dot suffix. Assuming we have a database called "db_test", the 
files will be: 
• db_test.properties containing the basic settings of the 
DB; 
• db_test.log: used to periodically save data from the 
database, to prevent data loss in case of a crash; 
• db_test.script: containing the table definitions and 
other components of the DB, plus data of not-cached 
tables; 
• db_test.data: containing the actual data of cached 
tables. It can be not present in some catalogs; 
• db_test.backup: containing the compressed backup of 
last “.data” file, that may be not present in some 
catalogs; 
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• db_test.lobs: used for storing BLOB or CLOB fields. 
Besides these files, HyperSQL can connect to CSV files.  
A client application can connect to HyperSQL server using 
the JDBC driver (.Net and ODBC drivers are “in late stages of 
development”), specifying the type of database to access (file, 
mem or res). HyperSQL implements the SQL standard either 
for temporary tables either for persistent ones. Temporary 
tables (TEMP) are not stored on the file system and their life 
cycle is limited to the duration of the connection (i.e. of the 
Connection object). The visibility of data in a TEMP table is 
limited to the context of connection used to populate it. With 
regard to the persistent tables, instead, HyperSQL provides 
three different types of tables, according to the method used to 
store the data: 
• MEMORY: it is the default option when a table is 
created without specifying the type. Memory table data 
is kept entirely in memory, while any change to its 
structure or contents is recorded in .log and .script files. 
These two files are read at the opening of database to 
load data into memory. All changes are saved when 
closing the database. These processes can take a long 
time in the case of tables larger than 10 MB. 
• CACHED: when this type of table is chosen, only part 
of the data (and related indexes) is stored in memory, 
thus allowing the use of large tables at the expense of 
performance. 
• TEXT: the data is stored in formatted files such as .csv. 
In our work, we use MEMORY tables. The Loader and the 
Serializer are the main parts of HyperSQL that we analyzed 
and modified. They are the mechanisms that load the data from 
text files at the opening and save them to the database at 
closing. 
1) Loader 
We suppose that the client connects to the DBMS using 
instructions like: 
Class.forName("org.hsqldb.jdbcDriver" ); 
Connection c = DriverManager.getConnection( 
    "jdbc:hsqldb:file:myDB", "SA", ""); 
Having used a catalog of file type, the static method 
newSession() of class org.hsql.DatabaseManager is called. Its 
task is to open the database or to connect to it (if it is already 
opened). org.hsql.Database is the class that represents the 
instance of the database in memory, so this is the root of all 
data structures designed to contain the information of the 
database. Once the database is loaded into memory, two 
fundamental classes are used for the parsing of text files: 
org.hsqldb.ParserCommand (for management of sessions and 
statements) and org.hsqldb.Scanner (for the recognition of 
individual SQL tokens). The class responsible for maintaining 
the database (related to the session) is org.hsqldb.SessionData, 
whose main attributes are: 
private final Database database; 
private final Session session; 
PersistentStoreCollectionSession persistentStoreCollection; 
PersistentStore is the data structure that contains all rows in 
a database table. Specifically, this is an interface implemented 
by using different classes depending on the type of table 
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represented: in our case we use MEMORY tables, so that the 
affected class is the org.hsqldb.persist.RowStoreAVLMemory. 
When the Database object is created, particularly at the 
invocation of method reopen(), the class 
org.hsqldb.persist.Logger, which is the class that represents the 
interface for I/O to and from text files of the database, is 
instantiated. The starter method of Logger class is 
openPersistence(), which will open the specified database (if 
the database is new, the related text files are created). The class 
org.persist.Log is instantiated after verifying the integrity of the 
.properties file. Our focus is on method open() of this class 
which checks the status of the Database (if it was closed 
properly, if it was modified, and so on) and then instantiates the 
class org.hsqldb.scriptio.ScriptReaderText to read the .script 
file using the method readAll(Session s). The class 
org.hsqldb.rowio.RowInputTextLog is used to read a single 
line of the database and the object that represents a row in the 
database is the object Row. Two methods of class 
ScriptReaderText are invoked: 
• readDDL(): reads the DDL statements and initialize a 
class RowInputTextLog for each line read from the 
.script file. 
• readExistingData(): it extrapolates the values of each 
single line, initializes the row and adds it to the 
PersistentStore; 
Because of the database file structure, we need to look for 
Insert statements to find the rows of a table. When one of these 
statements is encountered, it is managed by the method 
processStatement(Session s)  of ScriptReaderText class. For 
each field in the row, it checks whether it is primary key and 
determines the data type, then the value of the field is read by 
the method readData (DataType t) of RowInputTextLog class.  
2) Serializer 
The serializer is the module responsible for saving the 
modified data into .script and .log files.  Changes are initially 
written in .log file and moved to the .script file, when a 
shutdown command is issued. Each database table is 
represented by an instance of class org.hsqldb.Table, 
comprising: data structures for the management of content, 
methods for creating a new table, and operations of insert/select 
rows. When inserting a new row, the method insertSingleRow() 
of the Table class is invoked; the first step is to create a new 
Row object for caching data in memory, which is done by the 
method getNewCachedObject (Session s, Object [ ] data) of 
PersistentStore class. Memory-type tables are kept in a 
balanced tree structure (AVL) implemented in the class 
org.hsqldb.persist.RowStoreAVLMemory. Once a node (i.e. the 
row being inserted) is built and added to the AVL (this 
operation involves several checks on the contents of the fields 
and of integrity constraints), HyperSQL writes the row into the 
buffer and then transfers it to the text file (data is written to the 
.log file until shutdown of the database). To perform this task, 
the Logger class utilizes the method 
writeInsertStatement(Session s, Table t, Object [] data), and 
the method writeInsertStatement() of the Log class. Writing to 
the file is done using the class 
org.hsqldb.scriptio.ScriptWriterBase (more precisely, in case of 
memory-type tables, the ScriptWriterText subclass). The 
method writeRow(Session s, Table t, Object [] data) of 
ScriptWriterText class writes data to a text buffer and, at the 
end of the procedure, transfers it to the file. The buffer (which 
is only a byte[ ]) is encapsulated in the class RowOutputBase 
(more precisely, in case of memory-type tables, the 
RowOutputTextLog subclass), which extends the 
HsqlByteArrayOutputStream and provides methods to 
transform any type of data for serializing it into the buffer. 
Once writing to the buffer is completed, the method 
writeRowOutToFile() of ScriptWriterText class is used, which 
calls the method write(byte [ ] b) of the class OutputStream to 
write into the output stream of .log file. When shutting down 
the database, method writeScript() of Log class is invoked with 
the following tasks: creating temporary file for writing .script 
file, loading each element of the database into memory and 
writing it to the file by executing the flush()  of the 
OutputStream connected to the file.  
VI. IMPLEMENTED SOLUTION 
A. Client side 
On the client side, using IMDBs, we have only two 
interactions between each local agent and the Synchronizer. 
 
Figure 3.  Client’s state diagram 
Note that the client, after the first communication with the 
Synchronizer, can run offline. We modified the classes 
included in file hsqldb.jar to handle the encryption. The basic 
idea was to manage encryption in the .log and .script text files. 
The rows that are owned by the local client are stored in 
clear-text, while the shared rows “granted” by other owners are 
stored encrypted. The values contained in tables are stored in 
form of SQL insert: 
INSERT INTO table_name(field_1, field_2, …, field_n) 
VALUES(value_1, value_2, …, value_n) 
Earlier, to obtain control access granularity at the field 
level, we encrypted field by field. This way, the text contained 
in the database file was in the form of: 
INSERT INTO table_name(field_1, field_2, …, field_n) 
VALUES(pk, encrypted_value_2, …, encrypted_value_n) 
The primary key pk must be in clear-text, since it is used to 
retrieve the decrypting keys from the central Synchronizer. We 
dropped this idea because it requires changing the I/O code for 
each possible database type and an attacker may obtain some 
information such as table, primary key and number of rows. 
The current solution is to encrypt the whole row by AES 
symmetric algorithm. The encryption overhead is lower than 
the previous solution and all information is hidden to curious 
eyes. To relate the encrypted row (stored locally) to the 
decrypting key (stored in the remote Synchronizer), we use a 
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new key (id_pending_row). The encrypted row is prefixed by a 
clear-text header containing the id_pending_row delimited by 
“$” and “@”. The encrypted value is then stored in a 
hexadecimal representation, so a generic row is of the form: 
$27@5DAAAED5DA06A8014BFF305A93C957D 
1) Load time 
At load time, the .script file will contain clear-text and 
encrypted rows, e.g.: 
INSERT INTO students(id,name) VALUES(12,'Alice'); 
INSERT INTO students(id,name) VALUES(31,'Bob'); 
$27@5F3C25EE5738DAAAED5DA06A80F305A93C95A 
$45@5DA67ADA06AAED580FA914BF3C953057D387F 
INSERT INTO students(id,name) VALUES(23,'Carol'); 
The class whose task is reading the file and loading the 
appropriate data in memory is ScriptReaderText. 
 
Figure 4.  ScriptReaderText class’ UML 
The readLoggedStatement method parses each line of text 
in the .log or .script files and forwards the result to the 
processStatement method, which loads data into memory. We 
changed the readLoggedStatement method to make a 
preprocessing: if it finds a record header (enclosed between $ 
and @) in the text line, it extracts the 
id_pending_row_received. Using this id, the client requests to 
the central Synchronizer the related decoding key, which it uses 
to decrypt the entire text line and to proceed with normal 
HyperSQL management. If the decoding key is unavailable, the 
text line is temporarily discarded (it is not deleted if it was not 
received for communication problem with the Synchronizer).  
2) Save time 
The class ScriptWriterText manages the write operations in 
.log and .script files. The affected methods are writeRow and 
writeRowOutToFile. The former deals with building the string 
that will be written into the text file (INSERT INTO ....) which 
corresponds to the in-memory data. A Table instance contains 
the information about the table structure (table name, field 
names, types of data, constraints, etc.). The values of fields are 
in an array of Object. The SQL insert is written in a text buffer 
that is stored in the .script file by the method 
writeRowOutToFile. Because each table has an 
id_pending_row_received column, we modified the writeRow 
method to check if the row is owned or shared by another user. 
In the latter case (id_pending_row_received not null), the 
custom writeRowOutToFileCrypto method is used instead of 
the original writeRowOutToFile method.  
WriteRowOutToFileCrypto uses the parameter 
id_pending_row_received to query the related symmetric 
encryption key from the Synchronizer, needed to encrypt the 
whole buffer. The result is a hexadecimal sequence which is 
prefixed by the below header with the 
id_pending_row_received. 
 
Figure 5.  ScriptWriterText class’ UML 
3) Changes 
We can alter the original HyperSQL in three ways: 
• subclass original classes and override the affected 
methods 
• change the original code directly 
• use code injection by aspect programming 
The first is the cleanest method, but it implies collaborating 
with the support team of HyperSQL to implement some 
interfaces containing new methods to add new features in 
subclass. Lacking it, we had to revert to the second way. The 
third, which is less invasive and more maintainable, forces to 
have AspectJ compiler (or equivalent) in the client library. The 
changes regarded the classes ScriptReaderText and 
ScriptWriterText only (without changing the classes that use 
them). These are the classes that deal with I/O to and from the 
.script file. They are very mature and stable, so we think that a 
simple substitution of its .class files is sufficient to alter 
hsqldb.jar. 
B. Server side 
When a data owner adds or updates a row in the local 
database, it needs to propagate it to all the related users 
utilizing a central Synchronizer acting as a mailbox at server 
side, in the cloud. It uses a simple database with the following 
tables: 
• Users: containing, among others, the id and public key 
of each user; 
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• Pending Rows: containing the rows that are 
added/modified in the local owner’s database, until 
they are delivered to destination. A unique row_id is 
automatically assigned to each pending row. 
Additional information includes: submission date, 
sender and receiver. The changed row is stored in  
encrypted form in the field encrypted_row; 
• Decrypting keys: contains the keys that are used to 
decrypt the pending rows. Additional information 
includes: sender, receiver, expiry date, id_row. 
At change time, the owner (client side) must: 
• serialize the row; 
• generate a symmetric key to encrypt it; 
• encrypt the row; 
• encrypt the key using the public keys of receivers; 
• send the encrypted row and the decoding keys to the 
receivers. 
Because we store the serialized row, we need not worry 
about columns data types. The Synchronizer uses RMI to 
expose its services to clients. The services are grouped in three 
interfaces: 
• KeyInterface with methods related to encryption keys: 
depositKey, deleteDecriptingKey, 
getDecriptingKeyByIdPendingRow, 
getPublicKeyByUser; 
• SynInterface with methods for sharing the rows: 
sendRow, getPendingRowForUser, getAllUsers, 
resendRow; 
• RegistrationInterface to register and manage users: 
registerUser, SelectUserById, 
selectUserByIdAndPassword. 
VII. PERFORMANCES 
In contrast to the usual row-level encryption, which needs 
encryption/decryption at every data access, our solution uses 
these heavy operations only when communicating with 
Synchronizer, with a clear advantage, especially in the case of 
rarely modified databases. 
A. Read operations 
The system uses decryption only at start time, when records 
are loaded from the disk into the main memory. Each row is 
decrypted none (if it is owned by local node) or just once (if it 
is owned by a remote node), so this is optimal for read 
operations. Each decryption implies an access to the remote 
Synchronizer to download the related decrypting key and, 
eventually, the modified row. 
B. Write operations 
Write operations occur when a record is inserted / updated 
into the db, with no overload until the client, when online, 
explicitly synchronizes data with the central server. At this 
moment, for each modified record, the client needs to: 
• generate a new (symmetric) key 
• encrypt the record 
• dispatch the encrypted data and the decrypting key to 
the remote synchronizer 
C. Benchmark 
The test application we wrote uses our modified HyperSQL 
driver and interacts with the other clients through our 
Synchronizer. It performs these distinct activities: 
• Creation of database and sample tables 
• Population of tables with sample values 
• Sharing of a portion of data with another user 
• Receipt of shared dossiers from other users 
• Opening of the newly created (and populated) database  
The application receives three parameters: 
• Number of dossiers 
• Number of clients  involved in sharing 
• Percentage of shared dossiers 
To minimize communication delay, the central 
Synchronizer and the clients ran on the same computer. For 
testing purpose, it was sufficient to use only two clients (to 
enable data sharing). The application was compared with an 
equivalent one having the following differences: 
• It uses the unmodified HyperSQL driver 
• It doesn’t share data with other clients 
• When populating the database, it creates the same 
number of dossiers than the previous application; after 
benchmarking, however, it adds the number of shared 
dossiers, resulting in the same final number of dossiers. 
We benchmarked the system using single-table dossiers of 
about 200 bytes, in two batteries of tests; the first with 20%, 
and the second with 40% of shared dossiers, which numbered 
from 1,000 to 500,000. The results are represented by the 
graphs in Fig. 6-8. It is worth noting that the overhead 
percentage of the modified solution rapidly decreases (with 
100,000 dossiers it is around 10%), either in the first battery of 
tests (Fig. 6), and either in the second (Fig. 7). In the tests, the 
total delay (load + create + populate + receive) is linear in the 
number of dossiers and is limited, even with a huge number of 
dossiers (Fig. 8). Local results can be slightly altered by 
external events not preventable (e.g., garbage collector). 
D. Results 
The delay of the system is tightly bound to communications 
effort with central Synchronizer. Computing overhead is 
limited to just one encryption per record at write time and no 
more than one decryption per record at read time. Since we use 
symmetric encryption, these operations are very fast. The 
benchmark demonstrates that the delay is substantially 
concentrated in database opening, while the subsequent use 
does not involve additional delays, compared to the unmodified 
version. 
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Figure 6.  Overhead when 20% of dossiers are shared 
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Figure 7.  Overhead when 40% of dossiers are shared 
 
Figure 8.  Total delay 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, using IMDBs, we presented a simple solution 
to row-level encryption of databases. It can be used in the cloud 
to manage very granular access rights in a highly distributed 
database. This allows for stronger confidence in the privacy of 
shared sensitive data. An interesting field of application is the 
use in (business) cooperative environments, e.g. professional 
networks. In these environments, privacy is a priority, but low 
computing resources don't allow the use of slow and complex 
algorithms. IMDBs and our smart encryption, instead, achieve 
the goal in a more effective way. 
IX. FUTURE WORK 
We want to test the system in case of large population of 
users in the cloud. We are working to reduce the number of 
communications between local nodes and synchronizer using a 
form of group encryption. We are going to compare the 
complexity of the naïf solution with the group encryption effort 
to evaluate which are the parameters that affect the 
performance of the two alternatives.  
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